Biosafety incidents
273
reports of releases of dangerous agents inside U.S. laboratories during 2024, plus 9 of lost material and no thefts. None caused illness or infection outside the laboratory.
← All scenarios
Spaghetti Scenarios · Global risk
Synthetic pathogen / engineered biology
A microbe modified in a laboratory, more contagious or more lethal than natural ones, is released by accident or on purpose. Unlike a natural pandemic, it depends on human decisions, and that is why it can be prevented: with controls in laboratories, on the sale of genetic material and on the most dangerous research.
Reading a complete human genome now costs about 500 dollars; rules that oversee that capability are still the exception.
Spread of synthesis capabilities
US$525
is what it cost to read a complete human genome (2022). In 2001 it cost 95 million. Reading is not making, but it shows how fast these techniques are getting cheaper.
▼ More than 180,000 times cheaper than in 2001
Regulatory frameworks for dual-use research
1 of 27
countries with maximum-containment labs has a comprehensive national law overseeing dual-use research (2023). The treaty banning biological weapons still has no inspections.
▼ U.S. rules approved in 2024 were sent back to be redone in 2025
Maximum-containment laboratories worldwide
They are the only ones authorized to work with the most dangerous microbes. At the start of 2023 there were 69 spread across 27 countries; two years earlier there were 59 in 23 countries.
- In operation51 laboratories
- Planned15 laboratories
- Under construction3 laboratories
Three out of four of those already operating are in urban areas. Of the 20 being built or planned, 11 are in Asia.
Rules where the most dangerous laboratories are
Of the 27 countries with maximum-containment laboratories, how many meet each type of control (2023).
Dual use: research that, with the same experiment, can serve to protect or to cause harm.
What was reported in one year
273reports of releases inside laboratories in 2024
9reports of lost material
0thefts
230institutions registered to handle these agents
These figures are for the United States only: there is no global registry. None of those releases caused illness, deaths or infection outside the laboratory.
Capability and rules: an uneven race
The technique advances on its own; the rules come later and change course.
- 1975The treaty banning the production and stockpiling of biological weapons enters into force. It is born without inspections or a verification system.
- 2001Six years of negotiations to give the treaty a verification system collapse. They were never resumed.
- 2018A scientific journal publishes the laboratory reconstruction of a complete virus from synthetic DNA: the technical capability is demonstrated.
- 2024The United States requires recipients of public funding to buy synthetic DNA only from providers that screen dangerous orders.
- 2024The United States merges oversight of dual-use research and of microbes with pandemic potential into a single policy.
- 2025The treaty turns 50 with 188 countries inside, four signatories that have not ratified it, and no verification mechanism.
- 2025A presidential order suspends funding for the most dangerous experiments with microbes and orders the rules approved the previous year to be redone within 120 days.
Scenario profile
ImpactMajor (4)
NegligibleMinorModerateMajorCatastrophic
ProbabilityUncertain
RemoteUnlikelyPossibleVery likelyAlmost certainUncertain: there is not enough basis to rate it
Confidence in the evidenceLow
LowMediumHigh
WhenDecades
Where it leadsCollapse / Existential risk
ReversibilityPartially reversible or persistent
Synthetic pathogen / engineered biology
- Impact
- Major (4)
- Probability
- Uncertain
- Timeframe
- Decades
- Score
- N/A
- Confidence
- Low
- Reversibility
- Partially reversible or persistent
- Classification
- Biological / technological
Signals to watch
- Biosafety incidents
- Spread of synthesis capabilities
- Regulatory frameworks for dual-use research
Possible human action
- Laboratory biosafety
- Access control for gene synthesis
- Verification treaties